Any Cop in Ohio Can Pull Your Plate History
Columbus's own audit found up to 15,577 possible immigration searches on its Flock cameras.
Introduction
Type "wanted person" instead of "immigration" into one text box, and any officer plugged into Ohio's shared Flock camera network can pull up everywhere your car has been. No warrant. No supervisor signing off. It doesn't matter if you're a U.S. citizen with a passport in the glovebox, because the field that's supposed to justify the search is a free-text box nobody verifies. Columbus's own police department went digging through its logs, and found its cameras had been searched for possible immigration purposes as many as 15,577 times.
The company that built and sells that network, Flock Safety, states on its own website that it "does not work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement." Read literally, that holds up. Flock has no ICE contract. What it runs instead is a statewide sharing feature that any agency in Ohio's network can query, and one of the agencies wired in is the Butler County Sheriff's Office, whose deputies are cross-deputized by ICE under a 287(g) agreement and whose sheriff, Richard Jones, is an outspoken champion of that arrangement. Flock's denial is true and beside the point at once, because the product it sells is what makes the denial meaningless. Columbus's audit is the first time an Ohio government checked its own logs and counted how often that played out.
How a Reason Field Opened Columbus's Cameras
Flock's automated readers photograph every passing car and record the plate along with where and when it was seen. Columbus runs 48 of them, with 28 more being permitted or installed, on a contract worth about $228,000. The hardware is ordinary; the sharing is the product. Any agency in the network can search not just its own cameras but the pooled data of every other agency signed on. Ohio has roughly 900 law enforcement agencies, which makes vetting them one at a time close to hopeless.
The only thing standing between a search and your plate history is a reason, and the reason is whatever the officer types. When a query runs, the system asks why, and the answer goes into a free-text box with no supervisor approval and no check against what was written. Nothing stops an officer from entering "wanted person" when the real purpose is immigration enforcement. Columbus council member Melissa Green named the vulnerability out loud back in June: officers "don't have to write immigration enforcement, they could just write wanted person." Around the same council meetings, CPD's own Deputy Chief Tim Myers asked Flock to build a feature that would automatically block agencies with ICE agreements from searching Columbus's cameras. As of the audit's release, Flock hadn't built it.
Four Ohio sheriff's offices hold both a Flock contract and a 287(g) agreement, the deal that deputizes local officers to enforce federal immigration law: Butler, Lake, Portage, and Warren counties. All four are technically able to reach the shared pool. Only Butler County has confirmed it actually participates in the statewide sharing feature; the other three haven't answered records requests.
Columbus has banned city resources from civil immigration enforcement since 2017. The ban has a seam in it, though. As the Columbus Dispatch reported, the policy covers civil immigration enforcement and not criminal cooperation, and no one has established whether a search tagged "wanted person" that quietly serves an immigration purpose actually breaks the rule as written. The audit counted possible immigration-related searches. It couldn't confirm what any single one was truly for.
What the Audit Actually Counted
The number that led the coverage is 15,577, the audit's count of possible immigration-related searches run against Columbus's Flock data, according to the Columbus Dispatch and a WOSU wire story that ran across four Ohio public-radio stations. (The city released the audit late on a Friday, and the underlying document isn't posted anywhere public, so every figure here traces to that consistent secondary reporting, not to a PDF anyone outside city hall has read.) Two numbers inside the audit matter more than the headline. Only 20 of the searches came from Columbus police itself; the rest originated with outside agencies the city doesn't control. And the audit attributed searches to the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Border Patrol, and agencies holding 287(g) agreements, while specifically not finding ICE reaching directly into the cameras.
On its blog, under the exact question "Does Flock Share Data With ICE?", Flock answers "No," then adds the sentence that does the real work: "Decisions about whether, when, and how data is shared are made by the customer that owns the data, not by Flock." That line moves every question about misuse off the vendor and onto the hundreds of local agencies in the network, while Flock keeps selling the sharing feature that makes the misuse possible. The company says it removed federal organizations from its statewide and national lookup networks in August 2025 and added a single toggle to shut off federal sharing in January 2026. Both changes arrived only after more than a year of reporting across other cities, from Evanston to Dayton.
The federal ground under all of this shifted fast. The ACLU of Ohio's "ICE in Ohio" report, a primary document, found the state went from zero active 287(g) agreements at the start of 2025 to twelve by the end of it. Butler County holds the fullest stack of ICE cooperation of any county in the state: task-force deputization, jail bed space, and transport services, all at once. That's the same office that confirmed it plugs into the statewide camera pool Columbus was feeding.
Who Benefits
Start with the sheriff. Butler County's ICE cooperation is a revenue line as much as it's a political stance. The ACLU report puts the theoretical ceiling on what Ohio's ICE-accessible jail beds could bring the counties at $54,343,113 a year, at $108.77 per detainee per day plus $42.63 an hour for transport, spread across 1,272 beds. Butler County by itself has held roughly 2,000 ICE detainees since reinstating its detention contract in 2025, per Dayton Daily News reporting. Sheriff Richard Jones is on record calling it "beneficial to lock people up that have committed crimes in Ohio or come to the United States," and last October his deputies ran a joint operation with ICE that booked 23 people. No reporting ties those arrests to Flock searches, and I won't pretend it does. What's on the record is the money and the public enthusiasm.
ICE is the beneficiary that never had to sign anything. It didn't buy cameras or contract with Flock, and it got the reach of a nationwide network anyway, through deputized local officers who log in with local credentials and type a local-sounding reason. Researchers at the University of Washington's Center for Human Rights call this route the "side door," where a local officer runs a search on a federal agency's behalf. (That framing reached me through secondary reporting, not the underlying study, so treat the label as borrowed.) The side door's whole value, if you're ICE, is that it leaves Flock's denial intact. There's no contract to point at.
Flock benefits twice over. It keeps the roughly $228,000 Columbus contract and every contract like it, and it keeps the legal and reputational distance its own policy language builds in. When misuse surfaces, the story lands on a customer agency's choices, never on the sharing feature Flock built and sells as a core selling point.
A Denial Engineered to Stay True
Read the wording closely and the design gives itself away. "We don't work with ICE" is built to stay true no matter what happens inside the network. Flock signs no contract with ICE, so the claim holds even as ICE-deputized officers query its cameras by the thousand. The audit trails the company points to as proof of accountability run in one direction only: they record misuse after the fact, and only if someone reads them. Rob Frommer, an attorney at the Institute for Justice, told Truthout those audit processes "are simply not being used" and "are rarely, if ever, looked at after the fact." Columbus is the exception that proves him right. It looked, and the looking is the only reason a number exists at all.
The pattern turns up wherever these networks do. The same week Columbus released its audit, police in Pleasanton, California admitted their previous plate-reader vendor had let a Border Patrol office tap their data, in violation of a state law written to forbid exactly that. A separate audit in the Cleveland suburb of Cleveland Heights turned up 1,783 immigration-related searches on that town's 20 cameras, most of them from outside agencies. The vendors differ and the states differ, but the hole is identical: a shared surveillance network with an unchecked reason field hands federal immigration enforcement a reach no local government ever voted to grant.
What changed after 15,577 possible searches was a mayor's order, and not much else. Andrew Ginther directed CPD to stop sharing its data statewide and said "our data will not be used for the possible purpose of immigration enforcement, by anyone." That shuts one door on one city's cameras. The reason field still works the same way for every other agency in Ohio's network and everywhere else Flock operates. One toggle and one mayor's memo are not the same as a product that can't be abused this way, and Flock still sells the version that can.
The Bottom Line
The most honest way to read this audit is by its smallest number, not its largest. Columbus can account for 20 searches on its own cameras. The other 15,557 ran through a network the city doesn't control, entered under reasons no one verified. A city bought a surveillance tool and found out it had no idea who was using it, or why.
Columbus City Council is in recess until August 24, and Ginther has promised an internal-misuse investigation that hasn't started yet. This story is still developing, and the count could move. But the question for Flock is already sitting on the table: why is the one safeguard that would actually stop this, checking the stated reason before a search runs instead of logging it after, still the feature the company hasn't built?